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[1153] 
In re A-R-C-G-: A Game-Changer  
for Children Seeking Asylum on the  
Basis of Intrafamilial Violence 
Sarah M. Winfield* 
After over a decade of advocacy on behalf of women fleeing their home countries 
because of horrific domestic violence, practitioners and legal scholars obtained a 
precedential legal victory in August 2014. In In re A-R-C-G-, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals recognized that domestic violence can constitute persecution within the meaning 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and that nationality, gender, and the inability to 
leave a marital relationship can form the basis of a proper social group under the Act. 
 
Children fleeing intrafamilial violence, however, continue to face an uphill battle in 
seeking asylum. Widespread disparities in the outcomes of asylum adjudications in 
general demonstrate a need for uniformity and consistency. This Note argues that In re 
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Introduction 
Ms. C-G-, a Guatemalan citizen, regularly experienced horrific, 
violent abuse at the hands of her husband over the course of ten years: 
Ms. C-G-’s husband . . . beat her almost every week. . . . When she was 
eight months pregnant with one of their sons, her husband hit her in 
the stomach with such force that the baby was born prematurely and 
with a bruised leg. . . . On another occasion, [he] punched Ms. C-G- 
and broke her nose, causing her to have breathing problems and 
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affecting her speech. . . . [Her husband also] poured turpentine on her, 
lit a match, and tried to set her on fire. . . . [As a result, t]o this day, 
[Ms. C-G-] is unable to hear well out of her right ear and has scars on 
her breast. [Ms. C-G-’s husband] had affairs with multiple women, and 
even after moving in with one woman, he continued to demand sex 
from Ms. C-G-. Whenever she refused, he repeatedly raped her.1 
Ms. C-G- sought help from the police on several occasions and went 
as far as filing a formal complaint against her husband, to no avail.2 On 
one occasion, her husband threatened to kill her after she called the 
police to their home.3 She repeatedly fled her husband and stayed with 
her father, but her husband found and threatened to kill her if she did 
not return to him.4 On these occasions, Ms. C-G-’s husband also 
threatened her parents.5 Ms. C-G- obtained a restraining order against 
her husband, which he continually violated.6 Ultimately, Ms. C-G- fled to 
the United States because she feared for her safety and realized that the 
Guatemalan authorities would do nothing to help her.7 Ms. C-G-’s 
husband continued to threaten her after she arrived in this country.8 
It was against this backdrop that Ms. C-G- appealed an immigration 
judge’s9 denial of her asylum claim to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”), an appellate administrative law court that reviews immigration 
cases.10 On August 26, 2014, the BIA issued a precedent-setting opinion 
in Ms. C-G-’s case that paved the way for Ms. C-G-, and potentially other 
domestic violence victims, to obtain asylum in the United States.11 
By contrast, Rosa, a sixteen-year-old Mexican citizen whose 
situation was quite similar to that of Ms. C-G-, was not so fortunate.12 
Beginning when she was just three years old, her father beat her on a 
 
 1. Brief for the Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Studies as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
11, In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014). The brief is on file with the Center for Gender 
& Refugee Studies. 
 2. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 3. Brief for the Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Studies, supra note 1, at 11–12. 
 4. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389. 
 5. Brief for the Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Studies, supra note 1, at 12. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
 9. An immigration judge adjudicates trial level immigration cases. 
 10. For more information about the administrative law structure, and the role of the immigration 
judge and the BIA within it, see infra Part I.B. 
 11. See In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388–89 (B.I.A. 2014). The court defined a particular 
social group: “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.” Id. For an 
explanation of the elements of an asylum claim, see infra Part I.A. To learn how this particular social 
group fits into the analysis, see infra Part II.B. 
 12. “Rosa” is a pseudonym. This case (hereinafter “Rosa’s Case”) is on file with the Center for 
Gender and Refugee Studies. For the sake of privacy, identifying information has been redacted. It is 
worth mentioning that the BIA decided this case long before its holding in In re A-R-C-G-. 
Nevertheless, this Note argues that if the BIA were to decide this case today, In re A-R-C-G- would 
mandate a different result. See Rosa’s Case at 2. 
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regular basis, using objects such as a whip, tree branches, his fists, and a 
hose.13 The abuse left Rosa with cuts and physical scars, caused a 
dislocated elbow on one occasion, and often rendered her unconscious.14 
Rosa’s father did not permit her to seek medical treatment, and her 
mother prevented her from going to the police because she believed that 
Rosa’s father had the right to abuse her.15 On several occasions, Rosa 
attempted to escape to her grandfather’s home, but her father always 
forcibly removed her, beating her in front of her grandfather.16 
Ultimately, Rosa’s father threatened to kill her, causing her to flee 
Mexico in 1998, at the age of sixteen.17 An immigration judge granted 
Rosa’s claim for asylum, yet the BIA overturned that decision.18 Both 
Ms. C-G- and Rosa experienced horrific violence at the hands of family 
members, and both lived in societies that were unwilling to protect them 
from that abuse. Yet, the BIA overturned the immigration judge’s grant 
of asylum in Rosa’s case,19 but later paved the way for asylum in Ms. C-
G-’s case.20 
This Note argues that adjudicators should apply In re A-R-C-G- 
when reviewing children’s intrafamilial violence-based asylum claims.21 
Doing so would effectuate the Convention on the Rights of the Child’s 
(“CRC”) best interests of the child standard and would be logical because 
children must satisfy the same statutory requirements as adults to obtain 
asylum in the United States. Additionally, even though intrafamilial 
violence against children is often viewed as distinct from gender-based 
domestic violence, it often has similar patriarchal roots. Thus, In re A-R-
C-G-’s underlying rationale for protecting women applies equally to 
children. To demonstrate how this approach would make a meaningful 
difference in the adjudication of children’s intrafamilial violence-based 
claims, this Note applies In re A-R-C-G-’s rationale to the facts of Rosa’s 
case. 
 
 13. Rosa’s Case, supra note 12, at 2. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 6. 
 19. Id. 
 20. The BIA did not affirmatively grant Ms. C-G- asylum, but rather issued a precedent-setting 
opinion on one element of her claim and remanded her case to the immigration judge. In re A-R-C-G, 
26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388–89 (B.I.A. 2014). For more detail and a discussion of the legal implications of 
Ms. C-G-’s case, see infra Part II. 
 21. In the context of this Note, “domestic violence” refers to intimate partner violence, while 
“intrafamilial violence” refers to violence within a family unit. “Intrafamilial violence,” as a concept, 
encompasses both intimate partner violence and child abuse. 
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I.  Background 
This Part provides background information on asylum law and 
procedure, briefly explains how the BIA applied the law in Ms. C-G-’s 
and Rosa’s cases, and discusses the problematic lack of uniformity in 
current asylum adjudications. 
A. What Is Asylum? 
Asylum is a humanitarian form of immigration relief through which 
the U.S. government grants a specific immigration status to, and provides 
safe haven for, individuals who have fled extreme harm.22 Individuals 
who obtain asylum are legally permitted to stay in the United States.23 
One year after a person is granted asylum, she may apply for a distinct, 
less temporary immigration status called lawful permanent residence 
(otherwise known as obtaining a green card), provided that she meets a 
number of statutory requirements.24 For example, she must prove that 
she still qualifies for asylum.25 By comparison, individuals who lose their 
asylum cases and do not qualify for other immigration relief are expelled 
from the United States in a legal process known as removal or 
deportation.26 Thus, the BIA’s ruling in Ms. C-G-’s case increased the 
likelihood that she would be able to stay in the United States 
permanently. Its ruling in Rosa’s case, however, increased the likelihood 
that she would be forced to return to Mexico, where she faced further 
abuse. 
To qualify for asylum, an individual,27 regardless of age, must 
demonstrate that she satisfies the definition of “refugee” within the 
meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”): 
The term “refugee” means [] any person who is outside any country of 
such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no 
nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually 
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country 
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
 
 22. See Deborah E. Anker, Law of Asylum in the United States § 1.1 (2015). 
 23. Green Card for an Asylee, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Serv., http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/ 
green-card-through-refugee-or-asylee-status/green-card-asylee (last visited Apr. 8, 2016). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. A detailed explanation of the statutory requirements for lawful permanent residency are 
beyond the scope of this Note, which is primarily concerned with asylum law. 
 26. Removal and deportation are formal legal terms for expelling an individual without 
immigration status or a valid claim to immigration relief from the United States. Deportation, U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/deportation (last visited Apr. 8, 
2016); Removal, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/removal (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2016).  
 27. See infra Part II.A. 
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account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.28 
In other words, an asylum seeker must demonstrate that (1) she 
experienced harm in the past and/or has a well-founded fear of 
experiencing harm in the future that rises to the level of persecution; 
(2) a listed category applies to her; and (3) her abuser persecuted her on 
account of her membership in that category, a requirement known as 
nexus.29 Documentation of social, legal, and other pertinent conditions in 
the applicant’s home country is essential to establishing these elements.30 
As this Note explains in further detail below, membership in a 
particular social group was the crucial element in Ms. C-G-’s and Rosa’s 
cases. In In re A-R-C-G-, the BIA did not ultimately grant Ms. C-G- 
asylum, but rather paved the way for her to win her case on remand to 
the immigration judge by ruling favorably on the particular social group 
element.31 Specifically, the BIA found that Ms. C-G- belonged to the 
particular social group of “married women in Guatemala who are unable 
to leave their relationship.”32 
By contrast, the BIA held that Rosa did not belong to a particular 
social group.33 This holding reflects the fact that, at the time, the BIA did 
not acknowledge that domestic and intrafamilial violence could be tied to 
specific, identifiable characteristics that set their victims apart from other 
groups in societies. Now that the BIA has recognized that intimate 
partner violence may be connected to membership in a particular social 
group, there is a strong argument that its logic should also apply to 
children’s intrafamilial violence-based asylum claims. 
 
 28. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2016). 
 29. Procedures for Withholding of Asylum and Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2016); Regina 
Germain, Aila’s Asylum Primer: A Practical Guide to U.S. Asylum Law and Procedure 255 (6th 
ed., 2010). This is an intentionally broad overview. Detailed descriptions of each element of an asylum 
claim, and of the additional procedural and evidentiary requirements, could fill a treatise in and of 
themselves, and are therefore beyond the scope of this Note. This Note discusses only persecution and 
particular social groups, as they are most pertinent to In re A-R-C-G-’s rationale and to this Note’s 
argument. Additionally, this Note discusses persecution as a general concept, but does not discuss 
well-founded fear. 
 30. Germain, supra note 29, at 96 (“Supporting or corroborating evidence regarding an 
applicant’s claim is an essential component in every asylum case. This evidence may be in the form of 
expert or lay testimony, documentation from the applicant’s home country, newspaper articles, or 
human rights reports from the Department of State, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or 
other reputable organizations.”). 
 31. Press Release, Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Studies, Board of Immigration Appeals 
Recognizes Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum (Aug. 26, 2014) (on file with author). 
 32. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 33. Rosa’s Case, supra note 12, at 6. For a discussion of one example of a particular social group 
that could be used in Rosa’s case based on In re A-R-C-G-’s rationale, see infra Part II.B. 
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As the following subparts demonstrate, asylum seekers face a 
complex adjudicatory process in which there is very little predictability.34 
Applying In re A-R-C-G- to children’s intrafamilial violence-based 
asylum claims would ameliorate the burden that this process imposes on 
asylum seekers by making asylum adjudication more uniform. 
B. Mechanics of the Asylum Process and Administrative Law 
Structure 
An individual may assert her asylum claim either affirmatively, or as 
a defense to removal from the United States. When an individual makes 
an affirmative claim to asylum, an asylum officer in one of the eight 
regional U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) asylum 
offices interviews her in a nonadversarial setting.35 An asylum officer may 
choose to grant her asylum or refer her claim to a trial level immigration 
court, where an immigration judge will adjudicate her claim.36 In the 
immigration court context, an individual may assert an asylum claim as a 
defense to the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) efforts to 
remove her from the United States, and the DHS will appoint an 
attorney to argue against the individual’s claim before the immigration 
judge.37 Immigration judges’ and asylum officers’ opinions are not published 
and have no precedential value, making the process all the more obscure 
and complex for asylum seekers.38 
Both asylum seekers39 and the DHS40 may appeal immigration 
judges’ decisions to the BIA. The BIA reviews immigration judges’ 
factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard of review, but 
reviews de novo questions of law, discretion, judgment, and all other 
issues in appeals from immigration judges’ decisions.41 The BIA’s published 
opinions set precedents for asylum officers and immigration judges, and 
apply nationwide.42 Unfortunately, however, the BIA chooses not to 
 
 34. Asylum procedure occasionally varies for children. This Note’s proposal revolves around the 
substance and interpretation of asylum law, and only has procedural implications to the extent that it 
argues for an approach that would make adjudications more uniform. Therefore, such procedural 
complexities are beyond the scope of this Note. For more information about procedure in children’s 
cases, and how it should change, see, for example, Lisa Frydman et al., Ctr. for Gender & Refugee 
Studies, A Treacherous Journey: Child Migrants Navigating the U.S. Immigration System (2014). 
 35. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 Stan. L. 
Rev. 295, 306 (2007). 
 36. Id. at 306–09. 
 37. Id. at 309. 
 38. Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 Case Outcomes 
in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 Hastings Women’s L.J. 107, 109 (2013). 
 39. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 35, at 309. 
 40. Germain, supra note 29, at 255. 
 41. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(ii) (2016); see also In re V-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 500 (B.I.A. 
2008); In re A-S-B-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 493 (B.I.A. 2008). 
 42. Germain, supra note 29, at 349. 
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publish many of its opinions, which reduces the amount of guidance 
available to asylum officers and immigration judges.43 
An asylum seeker may appeal the BIA’s opinion in her case to the 
U.S. circuit courts of appeals, which may remand cases where the BIA 
issued a decision contrary to the law or abused its discretion.44 Despite 
the fact that an asylum seeker may appeal the BIA’s decision, the courts 
of appeals are generally deferential to the BIA.45 If a court of appeals 
interprets the law differently from the BIA, that interpretation only 
applies within its own circuit.46 The Supreme Court may grant certiorari 
to asylum seekers who have lost their cases at the circuit court level, but 
it rarely chooses to do so.47 Thus, as a practical matter, the BIA arguably 
wields the most power when it comes to asylum adjudications.48 
Asylum seekers, who are often indigent and speak little to no 
English, face an uphill battle throughout this complicated process. An 
asylum seeker has a basic right to seek counsel, and when she asserts her 
asylum claim, the U.S. Attorney General must notify her of this privilege 
and provide her with a list of pro bono representatives.49 However, 
individuals in removal proceedings have no constitutional right to 
representation, nor will the government provide representation to an 
affirmative asylum seeker.50 Thus, all asylum seekers—including children 
—face a mostly adversarial process in which they must often attempt to 
navigate U.S. law entirely on their own. They must frequently prepare 
their own cases and, in defensive proceedings, attempt to refute the legal 
arguments of seasoned DHS attorneys. This is a daunting task, as “the 
immigration laws have been termed[] second only to the Internal 
Revenue Code in complexity.”51 
The current lack of uniformity and predictability in asylum 
adjudication, discussed below, aggravates the already complicated nature 
of this process. This lack of uniformity affects all asylum seekers, 
including children. The appropriate response, as this Note argues, is to 
make creative use of the limited precedents available to protect more 
individuals with colorable claims to asylum, and to make adjudications as 
a whole more uniform. 
 
 43. Bookey, supra note 38, at 109–10. 
 44. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 35, at 310. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 349–50. 
 47. Id. at 310. 
 48. Id. at 349. For this reason, the discussion of the law in Part II focuses on the BIA, citing to the 
courts of appeals or the Supreme Court only where necessary to illustrate certain points. 
 49. Germain, supra note 29, at 163. 
 50. Id. at 194–95. 
 51. Id. at 195 (quoting United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 295 F.3d 943, 950–51 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
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C. Current Problems in Asylum Adjudication: Disparate Outcomes 
Well-documented disparities in asylum adjudication further 
exacerbate the difficulties asylum seekers face in asserting their claims. 
This is particularly problematic because the mistaken denial of a valid 
asylum claim almost always results in deportation of the asylum seeker to 
a country in which she is extremely unsafe.52 One recent study revealed 
significant disparities among asylum officers, immigration courts, and 
federal appellate courts, as well as between geographic regions.53 The 
authors’ analysis in the study also suggests that when immigration judges 
are the adjudicators, factors such as prior work experience and the 
quality of an application’s legal representation contribute to the 
disparate results.54 Factors such as these are irrelevant to the merits of a 
case. The fact that they may nevertheless influence case outcomes 
demonstrates a lack of impartiality in asylum adjudications. 
Though a detailed statistical analysis of children’s asylum claims is 
beyond the scope of this Note, there is evidence that this problem 
negatively impacts case outcomes for child asylum seekers. For example, 
one recent study analyzed data from 3124 children’s cases filed 
affirmatively with or adjudicated by USCIS between October 1, 2008, 
and April 23, 2013.55 The study found that “with all variables fixed except 
for Asylum Office, the marginal probability [of] success (asylum granted) 
of a child from Latin America or the Caribbean region being granted 
asylum is 87% in the Arlington jurisdiction, but only 42% for children from 
that region by the New York Asylum Office.”56 Presumably children from 
similar regions would not experience drastically different outcomes in 
their cases, as country conditions are central to asylum applications. 
However, this data provides further proof that outcomes may in fact 
depend on arbitrary factors such as the geographical location of 
individual asylum officers. Essentially, the disparity across jurisdictions 
suggests that differing social and cultural norms in various regions of the 
country may influence individual officers’ personal biases. When asylum 
officers allow their geographically dictated personal biases to influence 
case outcomes, they undermine the impartiality of the adjudicative process. 
II.  IN RE A-R-C-G-’s Rationale Applies to Children 
Adjudicators should apply In re A-R-C-G- to children’s intrafamilial 
violence-based asylum claims as a matter of precedent for three reasons. 
First, providing more protection to children with such claims would help 
 
 52. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 35, at 296. 
 53. Id. at 372–76. 
 54. Id. at 376–77. 
 55. Frydman et al., supra note 34, at 8 n.19. 
 56. Id. at 9 n.29. 
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the United States fulfill international obligations relating to children’s 
human rights. Second, children must satisfy the same requirements as 
adults in order to obtain asylum. Therefore, it is only logical that 
substantially similar precedents should apply to children’s cases, even 
where those precedents involve adults. Finally, the subordination and 
abuse of both women and children in certain societies often arises from 
similar patriarchal norms. Thus, using Rosa’s case as an example, an 
analogous particular social group to that of Ms. C-G- can be articulated 
in children’s intrafamilial violence-based asylum cases. 
A. Why Precedent Involving Adults’ Asylum Claims Is Also 
Relevant to Children 
As this Subpart illustrates, the United States must do more to 
comply with international standards on the protection of children when it 
comes to child asylum seekers within its jurisdiction. Applying In re A-R-
C-G- to children’s intrafamilial violence-based asylum claims would help 
the United States better meet international standards by providing a 
more predictable adjudicatory process to child asylum seekers and 
granting relief to vulnerable children whose claims might otherwise be 
denied. Applying this holding is also a sensible approach in a system that 
requires children to meet the same statutory requirements as adults. 
1. International Norms 
Recent treaties and developing international norms reflect the 
international community’s growing commitment to protecting the rights 
of children. For example, in 1989, a United Nations (“UN”) General 
Assembly Resolution adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and 
accession an international treaty on children’s rights, the CRC.57 The 
CRC mandates that “[i]n all actions concerning children, whether 
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the 
child shall be a primary consideration.”58 The treaty recognizes that 
children are uniquely vulnerable and need extra protection. 
Subsequently, the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (“OHCHR”) developed policies to further the CRC’s 
goals, issuing a series of guidelines. In particular, the CRC issued the 
Guidelines on Determining the Best Interests of the Child, which require 
that the best interests of the child be a primary consideration in all 
actions involving children, including children’s asylum and related 
 
 57. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 3, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 58. Id. 
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claims.59 These Guidelines urge the international community to implement 
comprehensive child protection systems, noting that such a system 
“comprises laws, policies, procedures and practices designed to prevent 
and respond effectively to child abuse, neglect, exploitation and violence.”60 
The United States has signed, but not ratified the CRC,61 and 
therefore under customary international law is required to avoid taking 
action that would defeat the treaty’s purpose.62 Regardless of whether the 
CRC is strictly legally binding, the United States has a moral obligation 
to apply In re A-R-C-G-’s rationale to children’s intrafamilial violence-
based asylum claims in order to better protect the interests of child 
asylum seekers within its jurisdiction. 
2. U.S. System 
The best interests of the child standard forms the basis of the child 
welfare system in the United States, yet the U.S. government does not 
use it as a basis for its policies concerning child immigrants.63 As a result, 
children seeking asylum are often treated no differently than adults, 
meaning that they frequently face the same complex processes and 
procedures outlined above, and also must satisfy the same statutory 
definition of refugee.64 Additionally, only some jurisdictions interpret the 
statutory definition of refugee in a manner sensitive to children’s unique 
needs.65 An adjudicator can achieve this by, for example, adjusting 
questions posed to a child, taking into account her age, maturity, and 
development, and applying relaxed analytical standards with regard to 
the elements of an asylum claim.66 Moreover, the BIA has not mandated 
child-sensitive interpretation of the refugee definition.67 For the most 
part, children seeking asylum in the United States are left on their own as 
they face procedural, evidentiary, and legal barriers that are difficult 
even for adult asylum seekers. 
Where the BIA has interpreted a statutory requirement that every 
applicant, regardless of her age, must satisfy in the same way, its opinions 
 
 59. Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Studies, Review of Gender, Child, and LGBTI Asylum 
Guidelines and Case Law in Foreign Jurisdictions: A Resource for U.S. Attorneys 4 (2014). 
 60. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Guidelines on Determining the Best Interests 
of the Child 17 (2008). 
 61. Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, OHCHR, http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (providing 
information on ratification status where users viewing map click on United States and scroll down list 
of human rights instruments to Convention on the Rights of the Child) (last visited Apr. 8, 2016). 
 62. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 312(3) (Am. Law Inst. 1987); see also id. 
§ 312 cmt. d, i. 
 63. Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Studies, supra note 59, at 3. 
 64. Frydman et al., supra note 34, at 8. 
 65. Id. at 10. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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should apply with equal force to people of all ages. Additionally, 
applying In re A-R-C-G- to children’s claims would effectuate the CRC’s 
best interests of the child standard because it constitutes a procedure or 
practice “designed to . . . respond effectively to child abuse” that would 
provide an additional avenue for relief to children fleeing intrafamilial 
violence.68 Failure to adopt this approach, on the other hand, would 
defeat the object and purpose of the standard because it would leave 
children with colorable claims to asylum vulnerable to an unpredictable, 
arbitrary adjudicatory process. Furthermore, as discussed below, the 
rationale underlying In re A-R-C-G-’s particular social group holding 
supports the articulation of analogous particular social groups in 
children’s intrafamilial violence-based asylum cases. Ultimately, applying 
In re A-R-C-G- to children’s intrafamilial violence-based asylum claims 
would enable the United States to use existing tools and doctrines to 
remedy its legal system’s shortcomings. 
B. Legal Standard and Analysis 
The following discussion will explain the legal standards for two 
elements of an asylum claim—persecution and particular social group— 
and their application to Ms. C-G-’s and Rosa’s cases. Persecution was a 
straightforward issue in both cases, but will be further discussed to 
provide context for the analysis. The legal argument will focus primarily 
on membership in a particular social group, as that was key to In re  
A-R-C-G-’s rationale. 
1. Background: Legal Standard for Persecution 
The INA does not define persecution, nor has the BIA precisely 
defined it.69 However, other sources provide guidance on the definition of 
persecution. For example, in its Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 
for Determining Refugee Status, the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (“UNHCR”) states: 
There is no universally accepted definition of “persecution”, and 
various attempts to formulate such a definition have met with little 
success. . . . [I]t may be inferred that a threat to life or freedom on 
account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership 
of a particular social group is always persecution. Other serious 
violations of human rights—for the same reasons—would also 
constitute persecution.70 
The BIA has also provided some guidance on the definition of 
persecution, describing it as “the infliction of harm or suffering by a 
 
 68. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 57. 
 69. Germain, supra note 29, at 33. 
 70. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status ¶ 51 (1992). 
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government, or [by] persons a government is unwilling or unable to 
control, to overcome a characteristic of the victim.”71 Though this 
explanation reflects the UNHCR’s position and clarifies who a 
perpetrator must be in order for harm to amount to persecution,72 it is 
overbroad73 and appears to confuse persecution with the nexus 
requirement, which is distinct.74 On the other hand, “[t]he lack of a 
precise definition or enumeration of acts that constitute persecution enables 
adjudicators to examine the circumstances in each case.”75 This broad 
definition provides flexibility to decisionmakers adjudicating individualized, 
fact-dependent asylum claims, rather than confining them to a narrow 
standard. 
International norms and case law further illuminate the harms that 
rise to the level of persecution. As one author explains, “[c]ustomary 
international law is generally considered to forbid . . . genocide; slavery; 
torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; and prolonged 
detention without notice of, and an opportunity to, contest the grounds 
for the detention.”76 Courts within the United States have held that a 
variety of harms, ranging from “threats to life, confinement, and torture” 
to “inability to earn a livelihood, travel safely within a country, and 
forced expulsion from the country,” might rise to the level of persecution.77 
Thus, a range of harms may qualify as persecution and it need not 
necessarily take the form of physical violence. Additionally, an act only 
constitutes persecution if committed by a government or by private 
individuals that the government is unable or unwilling to control. 
 
 71. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 72. In terms of private actors, the “unable or unwilling” requirement is now a well-established 
part of U.S. law. This Note focuses on this requirement rather than on governmental actors as 
perpetrators, because domestic and intrafamilial violence involve actors whom the government 
cannot, or will not, control. 
 73. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has criticized the BIA’s lack of guidance: 
[W]e do not hold that Sahi was a victim of persecution; we merely assume it in the absence 
of any effort by the Board of Immigration Appeals to define the word more narrowly than 
is plausible without the benefit of the Board’s thinking. The primary responsibility for 
defining key terms in the immigration statute that the statutes themselves do not define . . . 
is that of the Board of Immigration Appeals as the Attorney General’s delegate. . . . The 
Board has failed to discharge that responsibility. 
Sahi v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 587, 588 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 74. The record in In re A-R-C-G- illustrates this point. The immigration judge improperly 
conflated the legal requirements for establishing persecution with those for establishing nexus. See, 
e.g., Brief for the Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Studies, supra note 1, at 14 (“Although it is relevant to 
nexus, the persecutor’s motive is totally irrelevant to a determination whether harms rise to the level 
of persecution.”). 
 75. Germain, supra note 29, at 34. 
 76. Id. at 35. 
 77. Id.  
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a. In re A-R-C-G-: Domestic Violence as Persecution 
In In re A-R-C-G-, the BIA accepted the parties’ stipulation that the 
harm Ms. C-G- suffered rose to the level of persecution.78 Indeed, as the 
Center for Gender and Refugee Studies (“CGRS”) noted in its amicus 
brief, “[i]f the repeated rapes, beatings, stalking, and death threats 
present in this case do not constitute persecution for purposes of 
asylum . . . it is hard to imagine what would.”79 As the following Subpart 
demonstrates, just as domestic violence was unquestionably persecution 
in Ms. C-G-’s case, the intrafamilial-based violence that Rosa suffered 
also amounted to persecution. 
b. Rosa’s Case: Child Abuse as Persecution 
The issue of persecution was equally straightforward for Rosa, 
whose father severely abused her, and whose mother facilitated that 
abuse. The BIA “agree[d] with the [i]mmigration [j]udge that the severe 
injuries sustained by the respondent rise to the level of harm sufficient to 
constitute persecution.”80 Nevertheless, the BIA went on to deny Rosa’s 
application for asylum, identifying the “determinative issue” as “whether 
the harm experienced by [Rosa] was . . . on account of a statutorily 
protected ground.”81 In other words, the determination depended on 
whether her father harmed her because she belonged to a particular 
social group. Finding no cognizable social group, the BIA denied Rosa’s 
claim.82 
As discussed below, there is a strong argument that Rosa—and 
many other children with intrafamilial violence-based asylum claims— 
belong to particular social groups and therefore undoubtedly should 
qualify for asylum based on In re A-R-C-G-’s rationale. The following 
Subpart explains in depth the components of the particular social group 
element, discusses how the BIA applied this element to the facts of Ms. 
C-G-’s case, and finally demonstrates how it could be applied to 
children’s cases, using Rosa’s case as an example. 
 
 78. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 390 (B.I.A. 2014). The BIA nonetheless remanded the 
case to the immigration judge for further factual determinations. Having accepted the parties’ 
stipulation that Ms. C-G- had demonstrated persecution and nexus, the BIA focused its review on the 
issue of whether “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” 
constitutes a legally cognizable social group within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 392, 395. 
 79. Brief for the Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Studies, supra note 1, at 15. 
 80. Rosa’s Case, supra note 12, at 5. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 6. 
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2. The Contested Element: Legal Standard for Particular Social 
Group 
As noted above, an asylum seeker may win her claim if, among 
other elements, she can prove that she belongs to a protected category by 
virtue of her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership 
in a particular social group. Of the grounds listed in the INA, “particular 
social group is perhaps the least well-defined and understood.”83 
Nonetheless, the BIA has articulated some guidelines.84 For example, 
members of a social group must “share a common, immutable 
characteristic.”85 In addition, the BIA has more recently noted that to 
establish the existence of a particular social group, an applicant must prove 
that the group is socially distinct within the society in question and is 
defined with particularity.86 Finally, a social group may not be defined by 
the type of persecution suffered or feared, as such a formulation is 
“impermissibly circular”87 and should be defined “by reference to those 
immutable or fundamental characteristics” that cause the persecutor to 
target the applicant, so that the group is not overbroad.88 
A social group’s common, immutable characteristic “must be one 
that the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be 
required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities 
or consciences.”89 Examples of such a characteristic include “sex, color, 
or kinship ties.”90 Regarding children, 
the mutability of age is not within one’s control and, . . . if an individual 
has been persecuted in the past on account of an age-described 
particular social group, or faces such persecution at a time when that 
individual’s age places him within the group, a claim for asylum may 
still be cognizable.91  
 
 83. Dep’t of Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief at 7, In re [Name Redacted]. Pertinent 
information, such as the case name, number, and date filed have been redacted from this document. It 
is available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf. 
In its brief, DHS also noted that “[t]he seminal decision interpreting the term ‘particular social group’ 
remains [In re] Acosta . . . .” Id. (citing 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232 (B.I.A. 1985), modified, In re 
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987)). 
 84. Note that some Courts of Appeals have rejected parts of the BIA’s interpretation. Though 
the BIA recently responded to these Courts’ criticisms in In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 277 (B.I.A. 
2014) and In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014), it remains to be seen how circuit courts will 
respond to the BIA. Practitioners representing children should be aware of these jurisdictional 
variations, which are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 85. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 86. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 87. Dep’t of Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief, supra note 83, at 6. 
 88. Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Studies, Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims: CGRS 
Practice Advisory 10 (2014). 
 89. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
 90. Id. 
 91. In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 583–84 (B.I.A. 2008). 
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As a result, children such as Rosa, whose particular social groups are 
defined in part by their age, can satisfy the immutability requirement. 
In addition to satisfying the immutability requirement, an asylum 
seeker must demonstrate that she is a member of a socially distinct group 
within her society. To be socially distinct, a social group need not be 
literally visible.92 Rather, social distinction exists if “the set of individuals 
with the shared characteristic would be perceived as a group by 
society.”93 This “requirement considers whether those with a common 
immutable characteristic are set apart, or distinct, from other persons 
within the society in some significant way.”94 Additionally, a “group’s 
recognition is determined by the perception of the society in question, 
rather than by the perception of the persecutor.”95 Thus, if an 
immigration judge finds that an applicant’s tormentor harmed her 
because he viewed her as a member of a particular group, but also finds 
that other members of the society in which they lived would not view her 
as such, then the applicant will fail to satisfy the social distinction 
requirement. 
To meet the particularity requirement, a social group must contain 
traits that make it clear which individuals form part of the group.96 
Additionally, “[i]t is critical that the terms used to describe the group 
have commonly accepted definitions in the society of which the group is 
a part.”97 The BIA has explained: “[t]he particularity requirement 
clarifies the point . . . that not every immutable characteristic is 
sufficiently precise to define a particular social group.”98 That is, “the 
group must . . . be discrete and have definable boundaries—it must not 
be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”99 
An individual need only prove that she fears harm because she 
belongs to one of the five protected categories in the refugee definition, 
and particular social group is often viewed as a last resort for applicants 
who do not fit into another protected category.100 However, such a 
dismissive view of the social group category renders it meaningless when 
 
 92. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 238 (B.I.A. 2014) (“An immutable characteristic may be 
visible to the naked eye, and it is possible that a particular social group could be set apart within a 
given society based on such visible characteristics. However, [the social distinction requirement is] not 
intended to limit relief solely to those with outwardly observable characteristics.”). 
 93. Id. (citing Umana-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 672 (6th Cir. 2013)). 
 94. Id. 
 95. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 394 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 96. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Batterers as Agents of the State: Challenging the 
Public/Private Distinction in Intimate Partner Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 35 Harv. J.L. & Gender 
117, 142 (2012) (“[T]he social group category remains the ‘ugly stepsibling’ of the other four protected 
grounds—it is the last resort.”). 
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in fact it has been a crucial factor in many cases, In re A-R-C-G- 
included. Specifically, the BIA found that Ms. C-G- satisfied the complex 
particular social group requirements because her gender and relationship 
status were immutable, patriarchal norms in Guatemala cause women to 
be viewed as a subordinate class, and her particular social group was 
sufficiently specific to meet the particularity requirement.101 As the 
discussion below demonstrates, using Rosa’s case as an example, it is 
possible to articulate analogous particular social groups in children’s 
cases because the subordination of women and children in societies often 
arises from the same patriarchal norms. 
a. In re A-R-C-G-: Use of Particular Social Group in the 
Domestic Violence Context 
In In re A-R-C-G-, the BIA held that, as a matter of law, “married 
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship can 
constitute a cognizable particular social group that forms the basis of a 
claim for asylum.”102 The BIA noted that gender is an immutable 
characteristic, and additionally held that “marital status can be an 
immutable characteristic where the individual is unable to leave the 
relationship.”103 On this point, the BIA further explained that “a married 
woman’s inability to leave the relationship may be informed by societal 
expectations about gender and subordination.”104 
After addressing immutability, the BIA analyzed the social 
distinction requirement. The BIA held that the group was “socially 
distinct within the society in question.”105 The court noted: 
When evaluating the issue of social distinction, we look to the evidence 
to determine whether a society, such as Guatemalan society in this 
case, makes meaningful distinctions based on the common immutable 
characteristics of being a married woman in a domestic relationship 
that she cannot leave. Such evidence would include whether the society 
in question recognizes the need to offer protection to victims of 
domestic violence, including whether the country has criminal laws 
designed to protect domestic abuse victims, whether those laws are 
effectively enforced, and other sociopolitical factors.106 
Applying these evidentiary requirements to Ms. C-G-’s asylum 
claim, the BIA then explained that “the record in [Ms. C-G-’s] case 
include[d] unrebutted evidence that Guatemala has a culture of 
 
 101. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388–93 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 102. Id. at 388. The BIA said this “can” constitute a cognizable social group because each asylum 
claim must be adjudicated on an individual basis and is heavy fact- and context-dependent. That is, not 
every Guatemalan wife who cannot leave the relationship will qualify for asylum. Id. at 388–89.  
 103. Id. at 392–93. 
 104. Id. at 393. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 394. 
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machismo,” or male chauvinism, “and family violence.”107 Moreover, while 
laws purporting to protect domestic violence victims exist in Guatemala, 
the country’s National Civilian Police often fail to act on requests to assist 
domestic violence victims.108 
Finally, the court also found that Ms. C-G-’s social group was 
defined with particularity, stating that “[t]he terms used to describe the 
group—‘married,’ ‘women,’ and ‘unable to leave the relationship’—have 
commonly accepted definitions within Guatemalan society based on the 
facts in [the] case, including the respondent’s experience with the 
police.”109 Essentially, Ms. C-G-’s particular social group was narrow, 
specific, and included terms that reflected the role of women in 
Guatemalan society based on objective, expert reports and based on her 
personal experiences. Though the BIA did not ultimately grant Ms. C-G- 
asylum, it nonetheless paved the way for her to win her case on remand 
by directing the immigration judge to rule favorably on the particular 
social group element.110 
It is difficult to know the exact impact of this ruling on subsequent 
domestic violence cases because of the “lack of publicly available 
information from the government on individual asylum outcomes.”111 
Nonetheless, there is evidence that it has had a positive impact, and “[i]n 
many instances, attorneys have succeeded in getting cases sent back to 
the immigration courts to afford women the opportunity to submit 
additional evidence and argument to meet the new [In re] A-R-C-G- 
standard.”112 Additionally, an immigration judge in Artesia, New Mexico 
“called [In re A-R-C-G-] ‘a textbook case’” and her decision to grant a 
woman asylum based on its rationale “met . . . no opposition from the 
[DHS].”113 By contrast, children like Rosa continue to face uphill battles. 
As the next Subpart demonstrates, adjudicators can and should extend In 
re A-R-C-G-’s particular social group rationale to children’s intrafamilial 
violence-based asylum claims. 
b. Rosa’s Case: An Analogous Particular Social Group Can 
Be Articulated in the Child Abuse Context 
The issues that children face in Mexico allow for the articulation of 
an analogous particular social group to that in In re A-R-C-G- that meets 
 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. at 393. 
 110. See Press Release, Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Studies, supra note 31. 
 111. Press Release, Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Studies, Matter of A-R-C-G- One Year Later 
(Aug. 26, 2015) (on file with author). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Press Release, Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Studies, First Asylum Victory from Artesia 
Detention Center (2014) (on file with author). 
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the requirements of immutability, social distinction, and particularity. 
Research on children’s roles within the family and the limited resources 
available to protect them demonstrate that, just as Guatemalan women 
in intimate partner relationships are viewed as subordinate to their male 
partners, Mexican children like Rosa are often also viewed as 
subordinate to adult family members.114 Therefore, after In re A-R-C-G-, 
there are a number of different social group formulations that can and 
should be applied in cases like Rosa’s. The strongest formulation in 
Rosa’s case would likely be “Mexican children who are unable to leave 
the parent-child relationship.” 
First, this particular social group contains the immutable 
characteristics of age and family ties. Age is beyond one’s control, and an 
asylum claim may still be cognizable in the sense that age was beyond the 
applicant’s control at the time of persecution.115 The family relationship is 
immutable not only because a child is tied to her parents by biology or by 
adoption, but also because, as a result of patriarchal norms, children in 
Mexico are subordinate within their families and thus cannot escape 
abusive parents who will not allow them to leave.116 Their situation is 
analogous to that of married women in Guatemala, who, as a result of 
social norms viewing women as subordinate within families, are unable 
to escape abusive partners. The fact that Rosa’s parents prevented her 
from seeking help and thwarted her attempts to live with her grandfather 
provides additional evidence of children’s lack of autonomy and of the 
immutability of the parent-child relationship.117 
Second, this particular social group is distinct within Mexican society. 
Similar to the chauvinism and family violence that pervade Guatemala,118 
patriarchal norms in Mexico cause children to be “perceived as subordinate 
to adults” and “situated at the bottom of the family hierarchy,” while 
“fathers and elder male relatives are situated at the top of the hierarchy.”119 
These patriarchal norms influence the belief that both women and children 
are subordinate within the family and cause pervasive violence against 
women and children within families.120 The complex gender norms 
 
 114. See UNICEF, The Rights of Children and Adolescents in Mexico: A Present Day 
Agenda 80 (2011) (“One of the causes of violence against children and adolescents in Mexico—and 
probably in other countries as well—is the social perception that children are the property of adults.”); 
see also Gail Mummert, Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Studies, Child Abuse in Mexico: Declaration 
of Gail Mummert ¶ 5 (2010). 
 115. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 116. See UNICEF, supra note 114, at 80 (“Viewing [children] as rights-holders and therefore, 
worthy of respect and care, is not a very widespread notion and achieving a true culture of rights 
remains a challenge.”). 
 117. See Rosa’s Case, supra note 12, at 4. 
 118. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 119. See Mummert, supra note 114, ¶ 5. 
 120. Id. 
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involved are so pervasive that many wives and even children accept and 
justify male authority within the home and the violence that accompanies 
it.121 Additionally, “mothers are frequently perpetrators of physical 
abuse, very often because of their own fears of abuse by a violent 
husband, and their subordinate status with respect to their husbands.”122 
The traditional perception that children are subordinate in society 
and in families perpetuates a permissive attitude toward the physical and 
sexual abuse of children.123 The view of children “as unpossessing of 
rights, and as necessarily obedient and subordinate to adults subject 
children to continuing harm without redress.”124 Indeed, “human rights 
groups technically recognize children in Mexico as a vulnerable group.”125 
Statistics about child abuse cases in Mexico demonstrate their 
subordinate position in society and thus vulnerability to abuse. For example, 
in a 2013 Human Rights Report on Mexico, the U.S. government noted 
that “child abuse cases reported increased by 266 percent between 2006 
and 2012.”126 
Mexico’s legal system and the behavior of Mexican authorities 
reflect a permissive attitude toward child abuse and provide additional 
proof that children are a subordinate group. Legal redress for child abuse 
is uncommon primarily because the prejudices of “law enforcement 
officials, social workers, doctors and judges . . . inhibit effective legal 
protection [for children] because of the discretion with which [these 
individuals] are allowed to act with respect to child abuse.”127 For 
example, of 24,563 complaints of child mistreatment in 2006, “only 
fourteen percent of those cases went on to be prosecuted.”128 Given the 
biases and social norms surrounding the role of children in Mexican 
society, this severe lack of follow-through suggests that child abuse cases 
are a low priority for Mexican authorities. Moreover, “[b]ecause 
reporting suspected abuse is not mandatory under Mexican law, statistics 
that purport to reflect the prevalence of abuse more likely represent only 
a small percentage of actual instances of abuse.”129 To make matters 
worse, parents control their children’s access to the courts until they turn 
eighteen, causing further obstacles to relief.130 In sum, attitudes about 
 
 121. Id. ¶ 6 (“Male authority is accepted and even justified by many wives and offspring, often 
because of fear of retaliation, deeply-ingrained underestimation of their own worth as persons and 
lack of knowledge of human rights.”). 
 122. Id. ¶ 11. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. ¶ 13 (emphasis added). 
 125. Id. ¶ 28. 
 126. U.S. Dep’t of State, Mexico 2013 Human Rights Report 35 (2013). 
 127. Mummert, supra note 114, ¶ 26. 
 128. Id. ¶ 9. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. ¶ 27. 
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children in Mexican society—which are reflected in the country’s laws 
and prosecutorial practices—severely inhibit children’s access to justice. 
Efforts to change Mexico’s legal framework have been insufficient. 
Much of the time, legislation fails to adequately address the enormity of 
the problem of child abuse.131 For example, in 2000 Mexico’s federal 
legislature passed the Law on the Protection of the Rights of Boys, Girls 
and Adolescents, in an attempt to remedy Mexico’s failure to comply 
with international standards on children’s rights.132 This legislation is 
largely ineffective, as “current legal structures are still inadequate, and 
the principles embodied in th[e] law[] have not been implemented at the 
state level.”133 Moreover, “aspirational laws” such as this one have overall 
proved unsuccessful because “effective measures and the budgetary 
allocations to implement them have been slow to arrive in many places 
and non-existent in others.”134 On balance, it appears that while Mexico’s 
lawmakers have made some symbolic gestures, the country lacks the 
political will to effectively implement and enforce laws intended to 
protect children. As a result, the current legal regime furthers impunity 
for the physical and sexual abuse of children.135 
Anecdotal evidence underlines the fact that, compounding the 
negative effect of an inadequate legal framework, government officials 
simply do not prioritize existing programs designed to protect women 
and children.136 In one case, a father drowned his infant daughter as a 
warning to his older daughters, whom he abused physically and sexually.137 
After murdering the infant, he obtained a certificate from local officials 
claiming that the cause of death was an intestinal infection.138 The 
Mexican authorities’ permissive attitude towards child abuse perpetuates 
the status of children in families as a subordinate class within Mexican 
society, with less rights and legal protections than adults.139 
Third, the social group is defined with particularity and is not diffuse, 
amorphous, or overbroad. The group includes the child’s nationality—
Mexican—giving the adjudicator a cultural framework in which to 
conduct her analysis. Additionally, rather than focusing on all Mexican 
children, this particular social group definition is narrowed to the family 
unit. Further, it is narrowed to children who are unable to leave that unit 
specifically because they cannot escape their parents. Finally, traditional 
views of children as subordinate within the family remain pervasive in 
 
 131. Id. ¶ 23. 
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 133. Id. 
 134. Id. ¶ 24. 
 135. Id. ¶ 23. 
 136. Id. ¶ 24. 
 137. Id. ¶ 17. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. ¶ 26. 
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Mexican society, making “Mexican children unable to leave the parental 
relationship” a group easily recognized as a narrow, specific group of 
individuals by other members of that society.140 
In sum, expert reports on Mexican laws, social norms, and practices, 
as well as Rosa’s personal experiences, demonstrate that the rationale 
behind In re A-R-C-G-’s holding also applies to children whose societies 
turn a blind eye to severe abuse based on the notion that children are 
subordinate within the family. Adjudicators should apply In re A-R-C-G- 
when reviewing children’s claims for asylum based on intrafamilial 
violence for the following reasons: it would effectuate the CRC’s best 
interests of the child standard; children must satisfy the same statutory 
requirements as adults in order to obtain asylum; and analogous 
particular social groups can be articulated in children’s cases. Moreover, 
as a general matter of policy, adjudicators should seize upon any 
published precedent available as a means of protecting more vulnerable 
individuals and helping to make asylum adjudications more uniform. As 
the discussion below demonstrates, this policy-based approach would 
fulfill the legislative purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980 (“Refugee 
Act”) and, contrary to what some may believe, would not lead to the 
assertion of an overwhelming number of asylum claims. 
III.  Policy Considerations 
There are significant policy reasons for extending In re A-R-C-G- to 
victims of child abuse, rather than limiting it to victims of intimate 
partner violence. First, this approach comports with legislative intent. 
Second, the vast majority of children around the world who might qualify 
for asylum under In re A-R-C-G- simply would not have the resources to 
come to the United States. Thus, even if such children knew about 
asylum law and this precedent, the approach would not result in an 
uptick in asylum claims. Third, as a matter of foreign policy, the 
appropriate response to a fear of “floodgates” is to attempt to address 
the roots of human rights violations rather than returning vulnerable 
individuals to dangerous situations. 
A. Extending IN RE A-R-C-G- to Children Is Consistent with the 
Goals of the Refugee Act of 1980 
Following World War II, decades of international humanitarian 
crises combined with unsettled asylum and refugee law in the United 
States, culminated in the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, which 
amended the INA.141 The Refugee Act arose from a developing 
 
 140. Id. ¶ 34. 
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“consensus [favoring] a humanitarian, nondiscriminatory policy” and 
represented “the effort to develop a coherent and flexible refugee 
admission policy.”142 The Refugee Act “incorporate[d] the international 
definition of refugee from the United Nations Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees,” and “[i]n so doing . . . eliminate[d] the 
geographical and ideological preferences that . . . dominated” the U.S. 
immigration policies in the decades following World War II.143 The 
international definition of refugee can be found in the UN Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”) and reads, in 
relevant part: 
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall 
apply to any person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country.144 
In essence, the Refugee Act “adopt[ed] a universal approach to refugee 
admissions consistent with international standards and norms,” thereby 
“plac[ing] primary emphasis on ‘special humanitarian concerns.’”145 
A major theme underlying the Refugee Convention, on which the 
Refugee Act was modeled, was the idea that States recognize the 
importance of human rights and avoid repeating past mistakes, such as 
the failure to provide safe haven to Jewish people and other Holocaust 
victims.146 A growing recognition that women’s rights are human rights 
contributed to the BIA’s decision to articulate a particular social group 
for domestic violence cases.147 Similarly, developing international norms 
recognizing the importance of children’s rights148 suggest that applying In 
re A-R-C-G- to children’s intrafamilial violence claims would fulfill the 
 
the Refugee Act of 1980 [], the most comprehensive [U.S.] law ever enacted concerning refugee 
admissions and resettlement. . . . This legislation, the result of extensive efforts by Congress and the 
executive branch, create[d] for the first time a legal framework for the admission of refugees to the 
United States that is coherent, comprehensive and practical.”). 
 142. Id. at 9. It should be noted that refugees and asylum seekers are different in the eyes of U.S. 
law. The former are people seeking refuge in the United States from the outside, while the latter seek 
refuge after arriving in the United States. Both groups seek refuge because of persecution, and both 
must satisfy the statutory definition of “refugee.” The humanitarian concerns and crises that 
culminated in the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 apply equally to both groups. 
 143. Id. at 11. 
 144. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) as incorporated into U.S. 
law by the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967), art. 1, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 
606 U.N.T.S. No. 267 (entered into force with respect to the United States on Nov. 1, 1968). 
 145. Anker & Posner, supra note 141, at 11.  
 146. Karen Musalo, Personal Violence, Public Matter: Evolving Standards in Gender-Based 
Asylum Law, Harv. Int’l Rev., Jan. 2015, at 46. 
 147. Id. 
 148.  Our History: UNICEF Past, Present and Future, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/about/who/ 
index_history.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2016). 
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humanitarian goals of both the Refugee Convention and the Refugee 
Act. Nonetheless, the Refugee Act’s creators did acknowledge that the 
United States cannot provide refuge to an unlimited number of people.149 
However, as the following discussion demonstrates, applying In re A-R-
C-G- to children’s claims would not lead to an overwhelming number of 
asylum claims. 
B. Applying IN RE A-R-C-G- to Children Would Not Open the 
“Floodgates” 
Some express concern that applying In re A-R-C-G-, which involved 
an adult woman, to children’s cases would open the floodgates, 
overwhelming the U.S. immigration system and draining its resources. 
However, this is unlikely to occur. In a prior case, the government itself 
addressed—and dismissed—this argument as applied to women fleeing 
domestic violence. 
In its supplemental brief before the BIA in In re A-R-C-G-, the 
DHS examined the possibility of a social group based on nationality, 
gender, marital status, and inability to leave the relationship, with 
domestic violence as the underlying form of persecution.150 The DHS 
“accept[ed] that in some cases, a victim of domestic violence may be a 
member of a cognizable particular social group and may be able to show 
that her abuse was or would be persecution on account of such 
membership.”151 The DHS then addressed the implications of this 
approach, noting that not all domestic violence victims would be eligible 
for asylum because each asylum seeker would still need to prove eligibility 
for relief based upon the facts of her individual case.152 Additionally, the 
DHS observed that, as a practical matter, most domestic violence victims 
abroad lack the resources or ability to escape to the United States in the 
first place.153 In this vein, the DHS remarked that Canada, which 
recognized claims based on domestic violence in 1993, experienced a 
decrease in the total number of gender-based asylum claims asserted each 
year between 1995 and 1999.154 Additionally, the DHS noted, though 
asylum officers operating under USCIS began granting asylum to 
domestic violence victims in 2004, the number of claims asserted before 
USCIS remained steady between 2004 and 2009.155 Thus, women who are 
able to assert their domestic violence-based claims face heavy evidentiary 
burdens, which will limit the number who are actually granted asylum. 
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 150. See Supplemental Brief for the Dep’t of Homeland Security, supra note 83. 
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Additionally, common sense and hard data support the conclusion that 
most women simply do not have the resources to assert asylum claims at 
all. 
This reasoning applies equally to children fleeing intrafamilial 
violence. First, child asylum seekers, the majority of whom are indigent 
and speak little to no English, must represent themselves and will also 
face heavy evidentiary burdens. Moreover, any child who attempts to 
assert a successful asylum claim will be at a significant disadvantage in 
attempting to do so because of the intellectual limitations caused by her 
age. Second, children are more likely than adults to be totally 
economically dependent on family members simply because they are 
children. As a result, children fleeing intrafamilial violence are even less 
likely to have the resources to flee to the United States than are their 
adult counterparts. 
For the reasons outlined above, it is highly unlikely that extending 
In re A-R-C-G- to children’s intrafamilial violence-based asylum claims 
would lead to an overwhelming number of asylum applications. 
Additionally, even if an increase in applications were to occur, fear and 
worry are insufficient reasons to deny life-saving protection to vulnerable 
individuals. Moreover, protecting human rights internationally is a core 
part of U.S. foreign policy.156 In fact, as a matter of foreign policy the 
United States “seeks to . . . [p]romote greater respect for human rights,” 
including children’s rights specifically.157 Therefore, the appropriate 
response is to encourage foreign governments to address the root causes 
of the persecution, actively assisting them where possible.158 In so doing, 
the United States would foster a long-term solution to the problem. 
Conclusion 
Adjudicators should apply In re A-R-C-G- when reviewing 
children’s intrafamilial violence-based asylum claims. Children must 
generally satisfy the same legal standards as adults to gain asylum in the 
United States and this approach would effectuate the CRC’s best 
interests of the child standard by using existing doctrine to provide more 
protection to children. Moreover, In re A-R-C-G-’s rationale is as 
pertinent to children as it is to women because in many countries the 
subordination of women to their male romantic partners is interconnected 
with the subordination of children to their adult family members. Finally, 
 
 156. Human Rights, U.S. Dep’t of State, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/hr/index.htm (last visited Apr. 
8, 2016). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or Call to 
(Principled) Action?, 14 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 119, 120 (2007) (“[T]he response to a fear of floodgates 
should not be to return victims to situations where their rights will be violated, but rather to address 
the human rights violations that are the root cause for the refugees’ claims.”). 
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applying In re A-R-C-G- to children’s claims would promote consistency 
in asylum adjudications and would effectuate the Refugee Act’s 
humanitarian goals. 
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Appendix: List of Common Abbreviations 
 
USCIS United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
INA Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 
BIA Board of Immigration Appeals 
UN United Nations 
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child 
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
CGRS Center for Gender and Refugee Studies 
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